How safe are Pakistan's nukes?

The following is an editorial from the June, 8 2009 edition of Pakistan's The News (Link: http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=181795 )


Safe and Sound

Monday, June 08, 2009
As the army pushes the Taliban back on several fronts the hysteria that occasionally grips the western media in respect of our nuclear assets begins to fade. It peaked at the point where the Taliban took Buner, and there was a rash of stories about the vulnerability of our nuclear weapons – specifically that they were about to fall into the hands of extremists. They were not, and are very unlikely ever to do so by purely military means, and it is worth re-stating precisely why.

Pakistan has invested heavily in the security of both its production facilities and the weapons themselves. Nuclear warheads are stored in a disassembled state in more than one location. No warhead is attached to a delivery system. No delivery system is located in the same facility as the warhead parts. Triggering a nuclear warhead is a complex process requiring multiple people to sign off on any activation orders, and the so-called ‘permissive action links’ that electronically lock the warheads unless the correct codes are provided; as well as compliance with a range of environmental conditions for those weapons which are air-dropped – such as atmospheric pressure. All facilities where weapons are stored or manufactured are heavily guarded by personnel who are carefully recruited, screened and trained for the job. America has in the recent past given the Pakistan government $100 million to upgrade nuclear safeguards. In short, the idea of the Taliban gaining control of nuclear weapons by frontal assault is little short of preposterous.

However, there is a direct and objective threat that is less visible or obvious; and one that we need to monitor carefully. The threat comes from inside, from radicals amongst the educated who are in a position to purloin nuclear material (as has happened elsewhere in the world it should be remembered, with radioactive material occasionally showing up on the black market) and have the skill-sets to weaponise it. It is long and well-enough known that Al Qaeda would like to obtain nuclear materials, the makings of a ‘dirty bomb’. The risk is that they have sympathizers and collaborators within both the offices of state and within wider society, people who are engineers, scientists, technicians and perhaps even those in high office who could and would support or facilitate Al Qaeda in its goals. Al Qaeda has the capacity to mount sophisticated infiltration operations. The radicalization of our youth in universities, some of them training for entry into the various fields of nuclear science is natural hunting-ground for extremists. They may not have the skills themselves to create a weapon, or easy access to the materials – but would like to become the new best friend of somebody who can. Close monitoring and inspection as well as regular security screenings will help to mitigate the threat, but it is unlikely to disappear. The longer that the radical agenda remain embedded in our society, the better the chances of a collaboration between it and present or future technocrats and scientists. The Taliban present no threat to our nuclear assets in purely military terms – but their ideas do.

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The next item is a reply to the editorial:

Safe and sound -- Pakistan's nukes (http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=182527)

Friday, June 12, 2009
This is in reference to your editorial of June 8 titled "Safe and sound". While I am appreciative of the broader position taken by you on the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, on which there must be no doubt, western propaganda notwithstanding; there are at least two aspects that need to be seen in the correct perspective.Firstly, while your assertion that Pakistan has invested heavily in the security of its facilities and weapons is absolutely valid, your interpretation that the warheads are 'stored in a disassembled state in more than one location.

No warhead is attached to a delivery system. No delivery system is located in the same facility as the warhead parts' is basically speculative, conjectural and conveys a state of operational unpreparedness, which would be a very dangerous situation and seriously erode the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. I have never seen any official statement, and I emphasise on 'any' official statement, depicting the status that you describe in your editorial. The best description that one comes across is the position that our weapons are not on hair trigger, contrary to the Cold War times regarding the American and Soviet nuclear weapons. Now, not being on hair trigger, does not imply scattered and disassembled weapons. Somehow the latter perception seems to have caught the imagination, and needs to be corrected. Any military would want to strike a balance between operational readiness and preventing accidental or unauthorised use.

Secondly, I agree with your concern that there can be individuals in our society who may tend to think of an agenda to find links with people within Pakistan's strategic organisations to gain nuclear knowledge, thereby creating an 'insider threat'. This must, however, be seen in consideration of Pakistan's proactive response to such possibilities. Nuclear security is a multi-dimensional and robust mechanism that covers all aspects of security, including physical security tiers, intelligence systems, counter-intelligence set-ups, technical solutions to security and more importantly the so-called Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) that amply covers the human factor risk. All individuals within the nuclear establishment are subjected to the PRP, which commences from background checks, police records, medical records, etc and goes on to include security screening, periodic, as well as random security clearances, closely monitored access controls, two-person rule, sensitive material accounting, etc. The list is long and stringent. While one is never complacent about security systems and one must never be- we should rest assured that any potential tendency of a possible 'insider threat' would be identified at the outset and would be nipped in the bud. Finally, much seems to have been made of the so-called US assistance in this area. To the best of my information, it has been extremely modest, focused on very elementary training and mostly inconsequential -- and most certainly non-intrusive. All of the security solutions in place are home-grown and entirely indigenous.

Brigadier (r) Naeem Ahmed Salik
Islamabad
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So, while, on the one hand, we see Pak nukes are securely stored, but they are in fact, not stored in a disassembled state for the logical reasons outlined by Brigadier Salik. On the other hand, we have the possibility of internal theft which is a very real concern. (Let's not forget that back in September, 2007 the U.S. Air Force 'mistakenly' transported six nuclear armed cruise missiles from North Dakota to Louisiana....and if nuclear weapons unaccountability can happen here.......)