A couple of things to note. Bold text is my bold and, although I too am interested in the more recent diplomatic cables, the one below from 1972 that discusses F-4E fighter sales to Iran is noteworthy from a historical standpoint.
R 250930Z FEB 72 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7561 INFO SECDEF EUCOM CSAF
UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 1164 E.O. 12958: AS AMENDED; DECLASSIFIED JUNE 21, 2006 TAGS: MASS MARR IR SUBJECT: ACCELERATION OF F-4ES FOR IRAN REF: TEHRAN 1091: TEHRAN 263: MOSCOW 1603 COUNTRY TEAM.
MESSAGE BEGIN
SUMMARY
GENERAL AZIMI, MINISTER OF WAR, ON INSTRUCTION OF SHAH ASKS THAT WE TAKE ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT F-4E PRODUCTION LINE IN ORDER ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF ONE SQUADRON OF F-4ES TO IRAN IN 1972.
REQUEST REFLECTS SHAH'S INCREASING CONCERN OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN AREA AND ESPECIALLY THREAT SHAH SEES TO IRAN OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY UNDER CONSIDERATION BY IRAQ AND USSR. SHAH RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR US BUT IS TURNING TO USG WITH THIS REQUEST TO GIVE IRAN HIGHER PRIORITY ON FA-4E PRODUCTION SCHEDULE BECAUSE HE REGARDS US AS MOST DEPENDABLE FRIEND. END SUMMARY
ACTION REQUESTED: COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS US REVIEW F-4E PRODUCTION LINE AND RESPOND FAVORABLY TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 16 F-4ES IN 1972 FROM WHATEVER SOURCE MAY BE AVAILABLE. ¶1.
ON FEB 24 CHARGE WAS CONVOKED BY MINSTER OF WAR, GEN. REZANUZIMI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM SHAH. AZIMI SAID SHAH MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED AT TRENDS IN SECURITY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND EXPECIALLY ON HIS WESTERN BORDERS. US OFFICALS ALREADY AWARE OF SHAH'S CONCERN THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER GOI OFFICIALS (SEE REFTELS), BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ SOVIET RELATIONS INCLUDING AGREEMENT TO DELIVER MORE MIGS AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT PLUS INDICATION THAT RECENT IRAQI-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS WELL AS INCREASED MILITARY COOPERATION INJECT NEW SENSE OF URGENCY IN SHAH'S TIMETABLE FOR MODERNINZING AND STRENTHENING HIS ARMED FORCES.
MOST SPECIFICALLY, SITUATION REQUIRED IRAN ACCELERATE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND HOST PARTICULARLY DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT. ¶2. AZIMI RECALLED THAT GOI HAD REQUESTED DELIVERY OF 16 OF F-4E AIRCRAFT NOW ON ORDER BY IRAN (FIRST OF WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY UNTIL AUGUST 1973) BE ADVANCED TO CY 1972. HOWEVER, GOI HAD RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY USG AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS THAT PRODUCTION LINE FOR IRAN COULD NOT RPT NOT BE ADVANCED TO MEET 1972 DELIVERY DATES DESIRED. SHAH WAS MOST DISTURBED, AS ADDITION OF F-4ES IN 1972 WAS VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY AT THIS TIME.
SHAH HAD DIRECTED THAT USG BE ASKED, IF PRODUCTION FOR IRAN COULD NOT IN FACT BE ADVANCED, TO MAKE REQUESTED F-4ES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. SHAH'S DESIRE IS FOR DELIIVERY OF F-4FS IN LOTS OF FOUR DURING JUNE TO DECEMBER TIME-FRAME. ¶3. CHARGE REVIEWED RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-IRAN MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT AND CREDIT, AND STRESSED THAT RECORD INDICATED WE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED SHAH'S CONCERNS AND DESIRES AND HAD BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY RESPONSIVE TO SHAH'S WISHES.
CURRENTLY, AZIMI'S DEPUTY GEN. TOUFANS, WAS IN US DISCUSSING VERY QUESTION OF ACCLERATED EQUIPMENT ACQUISIION INCLUDING F-4E. ACCELERATION OF F-4E DELIVERY RAISED DIFFICULT TECHNICAL AND COST PROBLEMS AS WELL AS QUESTIONS OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND PRIORITIES. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE ISSUES WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN FULL WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED OF POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS AND REASONS FOR ANY LIMITATIONS ON MEETING GOI REQUEST THAT MIGHT EXIST. GEN. TOUFANIAN PROBABLY WOULD HAVE FULLER PICTURE OF SITUATION THAN WE NOW HAD IN IRAN. 4. AZIMI RESPONDED THAT GOI WAS BEING KEPT INFORMED OF TOUFANIAN DISCUSSIONS, BUT DECISON ON F-4E COULD NOT BE DELAYED. AZIMI MADE CLEAR SHAH FELT AQUISITION OF 16 F-4E AIRCRAFT IN 1972 WAS MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE MILITARY PROBLEM OUTSTANDING. HE STRESSED SHAH BELIEVED THAT NUMBER REQUIRED WAS SMALL IN RELATION TO US INVENTORY, AND THAT UNSETTLED SITUATION CONFRONTING IRAN WARRANTED ACCELERATED DELIVERY TO IRAN AS AGAINST OTHER POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS (AS TO EUROPE OR EVEN USAF) IN SAME TIME FRAME. ¶5. CHARGE NOTED WE WOULD TRANSMIT SHAHS REQUEST TO, WASHINGTON AND THAT USG IN SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH MARKED OUR RELATIONS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO BE RESPONSIVE. CHARGE SAID THIS SAME FRIENDSHIP REQUIRED HIM TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MEET SHAH'S NEEDS AS SHAH SAW THEM, OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, AS GOI KNEW, WERE CONCERNED THAT ACCELERATION OF AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION WOULD STRAIN SUPPORT AND OPERATIONAL MANPOWER OF IIAF AND COULD LEAD TO DECREASE RATHER THAN INCREASE IN IIAF EFFECTIVENESS. AZIMI REPLIED THAT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DELIVERED HAD BEEN, CLOSELY STUDIED BY IlAF WITH MAAG ASSISTANCE, AND IIAF WAS SATISFIED THAT SIXTEEN AIRCRAFT REQUESTED COULD BE EFFECTIVELY INTEGRATED INTO PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE.
AZIMI CLOSED MEETING BY ASKING THAT USG ANSWER SHAH'S REQUEST AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. ¶6.
COMMENT. SHAH IS DEEPLY CONCERN AT DEVELOPMENTS OVER PAST YEARS STRENGTHENING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN MIDEAST AND INDIAN OCEAN AND APPEARING TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIALLY ENLARGED SOVIET COMMITMENT, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY, TO IRAQ. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT INCREASED PRESENT DANGER REQIRES IRAN'S FIRST LINE AIR DEFENSE TO BE BEEFED-UP NOW RATHER THAN IN PREVIOUSLY PROGRAMMED SCHEDULE STARTING IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE NUMBER, FREQUENCY AND TONE OF DEMARCHES ON SUBJECT WE HAVE RECEIVED IS VIRTUALLY UNPARALLELLED, AND CAN LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIM CONSIDERS ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. ¶7.
WHETHER WE FULLY AGREE WITH SHAH'S CONCERN, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT REQUEST --LIKE USG DECISION IN 1970 ON SALE TO IRAN OF SEVENTH AND EIGHTH SQUADRONS OF F-4E --HAS BECOME ANOTHER GUT ISSUE IN SHAH'S MIND. SHAH IS AGAIN TURNING TO USG BECAUSE IN PERIODS OF ANXIETY SHAH FEELS HE CAN LOOK TO US FOR COOPERATION AND HE HOPES THAT US AS RELIABLE FRIEND WILL FIND CHANCE BE RESPONSIVE ON MATTER HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT AND VITAL TO IRAN'S SECURITY. THUS USG CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DECISION INVOLVES UNUSUAL DEGREE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE RELATED TO FABRIC OF USG-GOI RELATIONS. DECISION SHOULD ALSO NOT OVERLOOK OR UNDERESTIMATE IMPORTANCE OF IRAN FOR VITAL US NATIONAL INTERESTS. ¶8.
ACTION REQUESTED. COUNRY TEAM URGES THAT USG GIVE PROMPT AND SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION TO SHAH'S REQUEST FOR 1972 DELIVERY OF F-4E AIRCRAFT, FROM WHATEVER SOURCES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED (INCLUDING DELIVERIES TO USAF). WE RECOGNIZE THAT REQUEST MAY RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT URGE THAT EVERY AVENUE BE EXPLORED TO REACH POSITIVE RESPONSE. IT IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT THAT COUNTRY TEAM BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS TO ENABLE US CONTINUE TO MEET AND TEMPER SENSE OF URGENCY ON SUBJECT WHICH PREVAILS WITHIN GOI. IF DELAYS OR BARRIERS TO FULLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE MATERIALIZE, WE TRUST THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE (E.G. PARTIAL DELIVERY IN 1972) AND THAT PERSUASIVE RATIONALE CAN BE DEVELOPED TO FULLY EXPLAIN TO SHAH REASONS FOR ANY SHORTCOMING. IN ORDER TO DIMINISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT.
========================================
Below is a December 1989 cable dealing with Panama and another possible coup against Noriega:
P 131914Z DEC 89 FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7213 INFO SECDEF WASHDC DIA WASHDC USIA WASHDC 8090 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM PANCANAL COMM USLO CARIBBEAN AMEMBASSY BOGOTA AMEMBASSY CARACAS AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE AMEMBASSY MANAGUA AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY ROME AMEMBASSY MADRID AMEMBASSY BONNS E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PANAMA 08545 E.O.12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PGOV PREL PM US SUBJECT: PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP -- NORIEGA PLANS FOR A NEW YEAR IN POWER 1.
SECRET -
ENTIRE TEXT. -------------------------------- SUMMARY --------------------------------
2. THROUGHOUT 1989, RAPIDLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS HELD OUT HOPE TO MANY PANAMANIANS FOR A RESOLUTION TO PANAMA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE ELECTION OF MAY 7, THE SUBSEQUENT OAS NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLINE OF SEPTEMBER 1, THE COUP ATTEMPT OF OCTOBER 3, AND THE TREATY DEADLINE OF JANUARY 1, 1990. PROJECTING INTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1990, NO SUCH HOPEFUL EVENTS AND DATES ARE READILY APPARENT. THE OPPOSITION'S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SURVIVE POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND LITERALLY UNTIL THE NEXT COUP. NORIEGA WILL HAVE TO TRY AND CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER THE PANAMA DEFENSE FORCES (FDP) AND AVOID ANOTHER UPRISING.
3. PRESSURES ON NORIEGA HAVE INCREASED ACROSS THE BOARD, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DETERMINED THAT HE CAN MANAGE THEM. DESPITE NEW U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, THE MOST PRECIPITOUS ECONOMIC DROP IS OVER FOR NOW, FOLLOWING A TWO-YEAR, 25 PERCENT DROP IN GDP. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION REMAINS AN IRRITANT TO THE REGIME, BUT IT IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR NORIEGA'S STABILITY. U.S. ACTIONS, FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ACTING CANAL ADMINISTRATOR TO RUMORED COVERT PLANS AGAINST NORIEGA AS WELL AS NEW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ALLOW NORIEGA TO BEAT THE NATIONALISTIC DRUM AND MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIM IS GROWING.
4. NORIEGA.S WEAKEST POINT REMAINS HIS OWN INSTITUTION. WHISPERS THAT THE OCTOBER 3 COUP IS NOT OVER. CONTINUE AND NORIEGA CONTINUES TO HOLD ON MAINLY BY BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ANY POTENTIAL NEW INSIDE OPPONENTS. WHEN ANOTHER ACTION TO REMOVE NORIEGA WILL TAKE PLACE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT WAITING FOR THAT POSSIBILITY IS THE MAIN PROSPECT FOR PANAMA IN 1990. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------- THE CRISIS GRINDS ON ---------------------------------------
5. THE PANAMA CRISIS CONTINUES TO GRIND ON WITH NO CLEAR END IN SIGHT. NORIEGA TENACIOUSLY HOLDS ON TO POWER, INTIMIDATING HIS OPPONENTS AND FIRING UP HIS SUPPORTERS WITH SLOGANS CALLING FOR RETRIBUTION AGAINST PANAMANIAN TRAITORS AND THEIR U.S. MASTERS, SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO HIM. NORIEGA IS WEAKER THAN HE WAS AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR, BUT THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT SET OF PRESSURES HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO EJECT HIM FROM OFFICE. 6. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT PRESS REPORTS OF AN ALLEGED U.S. COVERT ACTION PLAN AGAINST NORIEGA HAVE ONCE AGAIN RAISED HOPES OF SOME PANAMANIANS THAT THIS MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF HIS END. NORIEGA HIMSELF IS APPARENTLY ATTACHING SOME CREDIBILITY TO THE PRESS REPORTS. HE HAS REACTED NERVOUSLY BY STEPPING UP HARASSMENT OF THE OPPOSITION AND INCREASING THE SIZE, TRAINING, ACTIVITY, AND ARMAMENT OF HIS DIGNITY BATTALIONS. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP IS CONCERNED OVER THE NEW EYE FOR AN EYE PARA-MILITARY CAMPAIGN, WHICH NORIEGA HAS USED TO REMIND THE OPPOSITION OF ITS VULNERABILITY.
--------------------------------------- REGIME POLITICAL ACTIVITY ---------------------------------------
7. THE RODRIGUEZ ADMINISTRATION, UNSURPRISINGLY, REMAINS INEFFECTUAL, BUT CONTINUES TO LIMP ALONG. REGIME SOURCES INDICATE WITH SOME DEGREE OF CERTITUDE THAT NORIEGA IS UNHAPPY WITH HIS CIVILIAN PUPPETS, THAT HE MAY EVEN FIRE RODRIGUEZ, AND PLANS TO TAKE OVER THE FORMAL REIGNS OF GOVERNMENT SOON. THE ASSEMBLY OF 510 LOCAL DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES (ANRC) CONFIRMED HIM AS NATIONAL COORDINATOR ON NOVEMBER 22. THIS BRINGS HIM ONE STEP CLOSER TO BEING NAMED HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, WHICH HE AND OTHERS AROUND HIM HAVE HINTED AT FOR SOME TIME. 8. MANY VIEW THIS NORIEGA MOVE AS THE FINAL STEP TOWARD A TOTALITARIAN REGIME AND FURTHER SEVERE REPRESSION. SOME SEE THIS AS A PENDING NORIEGA MISTAKE. AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD HAVE TO BEAR FULL OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIME ACTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, BY INTRODUCING A NEW ELEMENT -- HIS GOVERNMENTAL ROLE -- INTO THE STALE POLITICAL SITUATION, NORIEGA MAY BE ABLE TO USE HIS USUAL MIXTURE OF OBFUSCATION AND INTIMIDATION TO BUY HIMSELF MORE TIME AND POLITICAL BREATHING SPACE.
------------------------------------------ THE OPPOSITION ------------------------------------------
9. NORIEGA' S MOST RECENT PARA-MILITARY SHOW OF FORCE FURTHER CONVINCED THE OPPOSITION THAT POLITICAL ACTION WILL RESULT ONLY IN GREATER REGIME BRUTALITY AGAINST THEM, NOT NORIEGA'S DEPARTURE. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP QUIETLY HOPES THAT CLANDESTINE (AND OTHER) U.S. ACTION, POSSIBLY COUPLED WITH ANOTHER COUP WILL REMOVE NORIEGA. THE LEADERS SEE THEMSELVES PLAYING A ROLE IN THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT AND THEIR CURRENT PREPARATIONS ARE FOCUSED ON BEING ABLE TO MOVE IN TO FILL THE GOVERNMENT VACUUM IF THE NEXT EFFORT SHOULD SUCCEED. THE CIVILIAN OPPOSITION RECOGNIZES THE POLITICAL REALITY THAT THE MILITARY IS THE MAIN POLITICAL FORCE IN PANAMA.
10. AS THE MEMORY -- AND TO SOME EXTENT THE LEGITIMACY -- OF THE MAY ELECTION RECEDES, THE PRESSURE ON THE LEADERSHIP FROM WITHIN THE OPPOSITION RANKS TO DO SOMETHING TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IS GROWING, HOWEVER. OPPOSITION ABILITY TO CULTIVATE POLITICAL SUPPORT AND TRUST IN THE ADOC LEADERSHIP ARE HAMPERED BY EFFECTIVE NORIEGA INTIMIDATION AT THE GRASS ROOTS LEVEL. MEANWHILE, U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE CONTINUING TO HURT AND NEW MEASURES ARE UNPOPULAR. THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP FEARS THAT MANY PANAMANIANS -- INCLUDING THEIR FOLLOWERS -- WILL INCREASINGLY DEMAND THAT THE AMERICANS GET OFF THEIR BACKS, IF NORIEGA WON'T.
11. PANAMA'S OPPOSITION AND PANAMANIANS IN GENERAL RAN UP MANY SHORT TERM HILLS IN 1989 - WITH THE END ALWAYS JUST OVER THE HORIZON. MAY ELECTIONS, THE OAS NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1, OCTOBER 3, AND NOW JANUARY 1, 1990 HAVE ALL TOO EASILY BEEN ACCEPTED AS TARGETS FOR WHEN THE PANAMA CRISIS WOULD HAVE TO BE SOLVED. ALREADY ADOC LEADER GUILLERMO BILLY FORD IS TALKING OF FEBRUARY 25 (NICARAGUAN ELECTION DAY) AS A DATE BEFORE WHICH NORIEGA MUST FALL IF THE U.S. DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE THE PRECEDENT OF AN ANNULLED ELECTION REPEATED IN NICARAGUA . OVERALL, HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION HAS LITTLE ENERGY LEFT TO CHARGE UP ANOTHER HILL UNLESS CONVINCED IT IS THE LAST ONE. ONLY ANOTHER COUP HOLDS OUT SUCH A PROMISE, BUT THE OPPOSITION IS NOT ABLE TO INFLUENCE THAT TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE.
--------------------------------------- THE NEXT COUP ATTEMPT ---------------------------------------
12. THE MOST (AND MAYBE ONLY) HOPEFUL SIGN FOR NORIEG'S OPPONENTS IN 1990 IS THAT TROUBLES INSIDE THE FDP ARE WORSE THAN THEY HAVE EVER BEEN. REASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS FLOWING FROM THE POST-COUP PURGE ARE JUST NOW BEING MADE -- MORE THAN TWO MONTHS AFTER THE EVENT. MANY OF THE MORE PROFESSIONAL FDP OFFICERS AND NCO'S WERE KILLED, TORTURED, OR DISMISSED AFTER OCTOBER 3. THE SUCCESSOR CROP OF TRUE BELIEVERS HAS NEITHER THE EXPERIENCE, TRAINING OR INTELLIGENCE TO FILL THE SHOES OF THEIR PREDECESSORS. NORIEGA HAS HAD TO RELY MAINLY ON HIMSELF OR THE SUPPORT OF THIS SMALL CLIQUE OF LOYALISTS SINCE THE COUP ATTEMPT. HIS INCREASED USE OF DIGNITY BATTALIONS IS ALSO WEARING ON THE CAREER SOLDIERS. WHAT LITTLE MILITARY PRIDE THEY HAVE LEFT HAS BEEN INJURED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF THIS PARA-MILITARY RABBLE WHICH THEY FEAR WILL GET OUT OF CONTROL AND ULTIMATELY HURT THE INSTITUTION. WITH THE DIGNITY BATTALIONS AND OTHER IRREGULARS OVER 2000 IN NUMBER THE IMAGE OF A COMPETING PARA-MILITARY FORCE IS BEGINNING TO ARISE.
13. DISCONTENT AND FEELINGS OF REVENGE CONTINUE TO FESTER INSIDE THE FDP AND THERE ARE NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE PREPARED TO ACT ON THESE EMOTIONS. ONE REGIME INSIDER RECENTLY CLAIMED THAT NORIEGA'S NOMINAL NUMBER 2, COLONEL MARCO JUSTINES, IS HIMSELF LOOKING FOR WAYS TO INCH OUT HIS BOSS. MEANWHILE, NOTORIOUS CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS OF NORIEGA, SUCH AS XXXXXXXXXXXXXX(STRICTLY PROTECT), ARE ALREADY LOOKING BEYOND NORIEGA'S DEPARTURE IN ADVOCATING WITH EMBOFFS AN OPPOSITION DECLARATION OF AMNESTY FOR REGIME SUPPORTERS. SOURCES NOW INDICATE THAT NORIEGA SUSPECTS ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO UNSEAT HIM AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 15.
------------------------------------------ THE STATUS OF UNRELENTING PRESSURES ------------------------------------------ INTERNATIONAL -------------
14. THE RECENT RESOLUTION OF THE OASGA CONFIRMED NORIEGA'S ISOLATION IN THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WAS MET WITH ONLY FLEETING INTEREST IN PANAMA. THE FDP'S DISINVITATION TO THE RECENT CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES IN GUATEMALA WAS POTENTIALLY A MORE SERIOUS BLOW TO FDP MORALE, BUT THIS COLD SHOULDER FROM THEIR LATIN COLLEAGUES PASSED LARGELY UNNOTICED BECAUSE OF NORIEGA'S ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF INFORMATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE HIS INSTITUTION.
15. AMBASSADORS OF MOST NATIONS REMAIN OUTSIDE PANAMA, EITHER ON VACATION OR CONSULTATIONS, BUT LOCAL DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION MAY BE IN DANGER. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HIS VACATION TO REJOIN HIS ITALIAN AND SPANISH COLLEAGUES WHO NEVER LEFT. SEVERAL AMBASSADORS AND MILITARY ATTACHES (E.G. MEXICO) MAY VISIT THEIR FAMILIES WHICH ARE RESIDING HERE AT CHRISTMAS. NORIEGA IS MAKING ALL HE CAN OUT OF CONTACTS WITH THE USSR, THE PRC, LIBYA, CUBA, NICARAGUA, AND EVEN U.S. ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT GROUPS. HE WILL ALSO SEEK TO CONJURE UP SOME LIMITED LEGITIMACY IN HIS PLEA FOR LATIN SOLIDARITY OVER THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR ISSUE. ECONOMIC --------
16. THE REGIME CONTINUES TO HAVE CASH FLOW PROBLEMS, BUT THE ECONOMIC DOWNWARD SPIRAL HAS LEVELED OFF FOR NOW. NORIEGA IS ABLE TO COMBAT THE WORST DISRUPTIONS BY SALARY ADJUSTMENTS AND CONTINUED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OF LOYALISTS. UNEMPLOYMENT OVERALL IS ON THE RISE, BUT ONE OF THE PILLARS OF THE PANAMANIAN SERVICE ECONOMY -- THE COLON FREE ZONE -- IS HAVING RECORD SALES AND PROVIDES SOMEWHAT INCREASING EMPLOYMENT IN THE POLITICALLY VOLATILE COLON AREA.
17. MEANWHILE, PARA-MILITARY DIGNITY BATTALIONS ARE ENLISTING OR SCARING THE UNEMPLOYED. BUSINESSMEN, HURT BY NORIEGA AND U.S. SANCTIONS, ARE INCREASINGLY MORE LIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD ACCOMMODATION WITH NORIEGA. MANY FEEL THEY HAVE TO GIVE PRIORITY TO BEING ABLE TO STAY IN BUSINESS. U.S. PRESSURES --------------
18. FURTHER U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HEIGHTEN THE SENSE OF CRISIS IN PANAMA, CREATING THE PARADOX OF REGIME-OPPOSITION-CHURCH AGREEMENT IN OPPOSING THEM. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE U.S. PORT BAN FOR PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS AND THE APPOINTMENT OF A TEMPORARY CANAL ADMINISTRATOR CREATE NEW PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NORIEGA. BANNING PANAMANIAN FLAGGED VESSELS FROM THE U.S. WILL ROB NORIEGA AND HIS CRONIES OF A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INCOME. SOME OF THE LATTER MAY EVEN JUMP SHIP AND TURN ON HIM. BUT IN THE END RESULT, MANY MORE MAY REALIZE THAT IT WAS THEY WHO DEPENDED ON HIM, NOT HE ON THEM. 19. THE CANAL ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTMENT OFFERS NORIEGA SOME ADDITIONAL NATIONALISTIC PEGS TO SUPPORT HIS SEARCH FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. BLOWING THE TREATY VIOLATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WHISTLE MAY WELL GAIN HIM SOME SUPPORT. PLAYED WELL, HE MAY AGAIN BE ABLE TO DO WHAT HE DOES BEST: BUY TIME.
--------------------------------------------- THE FUTURE OF THE PANAMA CRISIS ---------------------------------------------
20. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OPPOSITION TO NORIEGA IS SHOWING SIGNS OF FATIGUE. FOREIGN ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR IS DISTRACTED BY MUCH HIGHER PROFILE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, FROM EL SALVADOR TO BERLIN. OF COURSE, NORIEGA TOO IS TIRING, EXEMPLIFIED IN HIS SLOWNESS IN SETTLING THE TURMOIL INSIDE HIS OWN INSTITUTION. BUT HE IS A MASTER OF SURVIVAL AND ABLE TO BUILD ON THE FATIGUE OF OTHERS. RENEWED NOISES IN RECENT REGIME PRONOUNCEMENTS OF A WILLINGNESS TO TALK ARE A CLASSIC MANIFESTATION OF TRIED AND TRUE NORIEGA TIME-BUYING TACTICS.
21. THE POLITICAL TENSION IN PANAMA, INCREASED BY RECENT PRESS REVELATIONS AND U.S. SANCTIONS ANNOUNCEMENTS, WILL LIKELY EBB IN EARLY 1990, ABSENT SOME MAJOR EVENT. NORIEGA IS SHOWING NO SIGNS THAT HE HAS ANY INTENTION OF LEAVING VOLUNTARILY. GIVEN BROAD POLITICAL REALITIES IN THIS COUNTRY, THE ONLY HOPE FOR A FIRST STEP IN CRISIS RESOLUTION IS ANOTHER COUP. WAITING FOR THAT TO HAPPEN IS THE MAIN POLITICAL PROSPECT FOR PANAMA IN 1990. BUSHNELL
=================================
Next up is a December 2009 cable from our embassy in Doha, Qatar dealing with their relationship with Iran: VZCZCXYZ0036 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHDO #0728/01 3541214 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 201214Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY DOHA TO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9582 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVES E C R E T DOHA 000728 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: ENRG PREL TRGY EPET QA SUBJECT: QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: "THEY LIE TO US; WE LIE TO THEM."
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). -- Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman and Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) to discuss energy research and development, critical infrastructure protection, and Iran. --
HBJ indicated Qatar,s interest in a bilateral critical infrastructure protection partnership. -- The PM was skeptical about the plausibility of Iranian acceptance of a nuclear compromise, saying he would be shocked if Iran abided by a deal to ship Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) out of Iran. -- The best way to deal with the Iranians, he said, is to get them to dictate the terms of any such deal. The U.S. and its partners should strive to get the Iranians to put the details in writing, including timetables for implementation.
-- HBJ characterized Qatar,s relationship with Iran as one in which "they lie to us, and we lie to them." -- According to HBJ, the GOQ tells Iran that it should "listen to the West,s proposal or there will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the middle of next year." End Key Points.
1. (C) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. Also present on the American side was State Department Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, David Goldwyn. DepSec Poneman thanked the Prime Minister for the meeting and expressed his hope that the U.S. and Qatar could strengthen their bilateral and investment ties.
-------------------------------------- (C) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION --------------------------------------
2. (C) The Deputy Secretary extended USG appreciation to the Prime Minister for Qatar,s support for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The PM observed in response that "We might have our own Katrina," an apparent reference to security concerns arising from Qatar,s relationship with Iran. Deputy Secretary offered U.S. help to Qatar in protecting its critical infrastructure and in addressing its broader security concerns. Expressing interest in critical infrastructure protection, HBJ said he would talk to the Ministries of Energy and Interior on how best to take advantage of U.S. assistance.
--------------------------------- SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT ---------------------------------
3. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised science and technology investment, noting DoE interest in partnering with the GOQ on energy-related research and development projects. As an example of possible cooperation, DepSec Poneman cited computer simulation, emphasizing that the DOE national laboratories are international leaders in the field.
4. (C) The Deputy Secretary reported that DoE had recently invested in a nanotechnology program and cited this as another possible area of cooperation, telling the PM there are additional opportunities for GOQ partnerships with private labs. Shaykh Hamad immediately expressed strong interest in nanotechnology, and asked the DepSec to provide him with a paper on that subject. The DepSec agreed, and added that he would be pleased to host Shaykh Hamad at the Sandia nanotechnology facility or another national lab.
5. (C) Turning to genomics and solar technology as they relate to food production and Qatar,s National Food Security Program, Shaykh Hamad told the Deputy Secretary that he supported research in those fields, but expressed his opinion that Qatar,s investment in food and solar technology must be done on a commercial basis.
-------------------------- (S) IRAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM ---------------------------
6. (S) DepSec Poneman asked HBJ for his views on Iran,s nuclear program. The Deputy Secretary noted that the USG had entered into recent discussions with Iran not out of naivet, but as an effort to address a humanitarian concern (the need for medical isotopes) while also attempting to remove a meaningful amount of special nuclear material. Even though the effort had not to date resulted in Iranian agreement, it had borne fruit in the form of Russian and Chinese support for the most recent resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. The PM expressed his skepticism that the West would be able to reach a deal with Iran,s leaders, saying "I,d be surprised and shocked if the Iranians do a deal. You always think you have a deal with them and then you don,t." He continued, "The EU, Chirac, and Solana...they all thought they had a deal... Solana said two weeks; I advised him it would take two years."
7. (S) Asked for his advice on how best to approach the Iranians, HBJ said it is imperative that the Iranians commit to draft any deal, including a timetable. He reiterated that it is important to "make them tell you (what they will do). Otherwise they will say 'yes, but...' and the 'but' will be worse than a 'no.'" The Deputy Secretary countered that, "They don,t want to make a proposal." To which HBJ responded, "You don,t understand. Even Mousavi can,t make a deal!" Poneman pressed the issue, saying the U.S. would not be offering a better deal than what is currently on the table. The Prime Minster said, "I know, but this is the way they are."
8. (S) Referring to the current proposal on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), Deputy Secretary Poneman stressed: "This is a fleeting opportunity. If they don,t take this deal, what comes next is worse." The PM noted that the Iranians frequently press the Qataris to have dialogue on their shared natural gas field and attempt to expand the dialogue to include other subjects. HBJ said that the Qataris "are always throwing cold water on their ideas."
9. (S) On Qatar,s close ties with Iran, the PM added that he knows the U.S. becomes upset at times by what it hears about the Qatar/Iran relationship. However he characterized the relationship as one in which "They lie to us, and we lie to them." Poneman replied by underscoring that "It would be helpful if everywhere they went, they (the Iranians) heard the same thing." The PM said for Qatar,s part, he had told Iran that it should "listen to the West, s proposal or there will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the middle of next year." Poneman observed that the Russians had pressed the Iranians hard during the Vienna negotiations, reinforcing the view that Iranian failure to accept the Tehran Research Reactor deal would lead back to the UN Security Council. The PM asked if the U.S. believes the Russians were in agreement with the U.S. on the possibility of harsher measures. Poneman replied that, for now, the Russians appear to be holding a similar line to the USG on the TRR deal and we remain in close contact with Moscow.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSec Poneman at Department of Energy. LeBaron
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The last cable I'm including in this post is from our Beijing embassy and is dated Feb.2010. It deals with technology control but shows that the Russians and Chinese are helping Iran: VZCZCXYZ0026 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #9939 0321611 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 011605Z FEB 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2747 INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7036S E C R E T STATE 009939 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2035 TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL MNUC ETTC KSCA IR CH SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING CHINA TO POSSIBLE MISSILE-RELATED EXPORT TO IRAN Classified By: (U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS DAVID B. SHEAR, REASON: 1.4 (C).
1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 3.
2. (S) Background/Objective: The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, the Chinese company Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. offered to sell gyroscopes produced by a Russian company to Iran's Isfahan Optics Industries. Our information indicates that these gyroscopes could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). Because key missile development organizations in Iran previously have attempted to procure similar gyroscopes, we are concerned this equipment potentially could be diverted to missile-related end-users. We therefore want to alert Chinese officials to this information and ask that they investigate this activity with a view to preventing Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. from facilitating missile-related exports to Iran.
3. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 4 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
4. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: (SECRET//REL CHINA) --We would like to alert you to information of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity. --The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd., a Chinese company based in Futian, China, had offered to sell Iran's Isfahan Optics Industries gyroscopes produced by a Russian company. --Our information indicates that these gyroscopes could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). --We are bringing this matter to your attention to support your export control efforts as we are concerned this equipment potentially could be diverted to missile-related end-users in Iran. --We understand that the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is responsible for overseeing all of Iran's missile programs, has previously attempted to procure similar gyroscopes. --We hope you will use this information to investigate this activity and take all appropriate measures to ensure that Hong Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. is not facilitating unauthorized exports of missile technology to Iran. --We believe taking such action would be consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1803, which require countries to prevent transfers of items to and from Iran that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. --We look forward to continued cooperation (My ass) on missile nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information. End talking points/non-paper
5. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR James Mayes (Phone: 202-647-3185). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/CM. 6. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON
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